While analyzing CAIDA Internet traces of TCP traffic to detect instances of data reneging, we frequently observed seven misbehaviors in the generation of SACKs. These misbehaviors could result in a data sender mistakenly thinking data reneging occurred. With one misbehavior, the worst case could result in a data sender receiving a SACK for data that was transmitted but never received. This paper presents a methodology and its application to test a wide range of operating systems using TBIT to fingerprint which ones misbehave in each of the seven ways. Measuring the performance loss due to these misbehaviors is outside the scope of this study; the goal is to document the misbehaviors so they may be corrected. One can conclude that the handling of SACKs while simple in concept is complex to implement.
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Misbehaviors in TCP SACK Generation
Nasif Ekiz, Abuthahir Habeeb Rahman, and Paul D. Amer This paper presents a study of eight misbehaviors in TCP SACK generation in TCP/IP stacks in commodity operating systems. The misbehaviors were first identified in a study of CAIDA TCP traffic traces that the authors conducted in previous work. After describing the misbehaviors, the paper uses TBIT to implement a number of tests to detect whether these misbehaviors appear in Windows, Linux, Mac OSX, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris, and OpenSolaris. The bad news is that most operating systems exhibit one or more of these misbehaviors. The good news is that newer versions of each OS had less misbehaviors than older ones.
Seven out of the eight misbehaviors discussed do not affect correctness, and the eight one manifests only in Solaris and OpenSolaris. In fact, as all reviewers pointed out, most of these misbehaviors are due to the lack of (or incorrect) implementation of SHOULD clauses in several RFCs. For example, in one example, a host sends fewer TCP SACK blocks then it could; in another one, a host does not include SACK information in FIN segments. The most serious misbehavior is due to SACK information from earlier connections appearing in later ones (definitely a bug).
The paper is interesting in two ways. First, it is informative about the state of TCP SACK generation in TCP/IP stacks today. Second, it is a great example of how complex algorithms are incredibly hard to "get right" in practice. Personally, I'd even consider using this paper in an undergraduate systems and networking design course to illustrate the effects of complex designs in practice. Despite being over a decade old, TCP SACK implementations are still incomplete in today's commodity operating systems.
INTRODUCTION
The Selective Acknowledgment (SACK) mechanism, RFC2018 [11] , an extension to Transmission Control Protocol's (TCP) [15] ACK mechanism, allows a data receiver to explicitly acknowledge arrived out-of-order data to a data sender. When using SACKs, a TCP data sender need not retransmit SACKed data during the loss recovery period. Previous research [1, 5, 8] showed that SACKs improve TCP throughput when multiple losses occur within the same window. The success of SACK-based loss recovery algorithm [3] is proportional to the SACK information received from the data receiver. In this paper, we investigate RFC2018 conformant SACK generation.
Deployment of the SACK option in TCP connections has been a slow, but steadily increasing trend. In 2001, 41% of the web servers tested were SACK-enabled [13] . In 2004, SACK-enabled web servers increased to 68% [12] . All of the operating systems tested in this study accept SACK-permitted TCP connections.
Today's reliable transport protocols such as TCP and Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [16] are designed to tolerate data receiver reneging (simply, data reneging) (Section 8 RFC2018). Data reneging occurs when a data receiver SACKs data, and later discards that data from its receiver buffer prior to delivering it to a receiving application (or receiving socket buffer).
In related research, we argue that reliable transport protocols should not be designed to tolerate data reneging; largely because we believe data reneging rarely if ever occurs in practice [7] . While developing our software to discover data reneging in trace data, we analyzed TCP SACK information within Internet traces provided by the Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [6] . At first it seemed that data reneging was happening frequently. On closer inspection however, it appears that the generation of SACKs in many TCP connections potentially was incorrect according to RFC2018. Sometimes SACK information that should have been sent was not. Sometimes the wrong SACK information was sent. In one misbehavior, SACKs from one connection are sent in the SYN-ACK used to open a later connection! These misbehaviors wrongly gave the impression that data reneging was occurring.
Our discovery led us to verifying SACK generation behavior of TCP data receivers for a wide range of operating systems. In this paper, our goal is to present a methodology for verifying SACK behavior, and to apply the methodology to report misbehaving TCP stacks. The goal of the paper is not to measure how much the misbehaviors degrade the performance, but rather to identify misbehaving TCP stacks so they will be corrected.
We first present in Section 2 seven misbehaviors, five (A-E) observed in the CAIDA traces, and two (F-G) additional SACK related misbehaviors observed during our testing of A-E. Technically, misbehaviors A-E indicate that SHOULD requirements of RFC2018 are not being followed, and SHOULD means "that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a particular item, but the full implications must be understood and carefully weighed before choosing a different course." Upon analysis, we believe these misbehaviors to be accidental, not incidental.
Misbehaviors A-F can reduce the effectiveness of SACKs. Misbehavior G is the worst one where a data receiver transmits a SACK for data that was never received, thus questioning the data transfer reliability of the connection. To discover which implementations are misbehaving, we defined seven test extensions to the TCP Behavior Inference Tool (TBIT) [19] , a tool that verifies TCP endpoint behavior.
The methodology using TBIT is described in Section 3, and the results of our TBIT tests are presented in Section 4. Section 5 identifies related research used to infer TCP behavior, and Section 6 concludes our work. That is, more than two SACK blocks at the data receiver are known to exist (say X l -X r , Y l -Y r , and Z l -Z r ) but only two SACK blocks are reported (X l -X r and Y l -Y r ). When the cumulative ACK advances beyond X r , SACK block X l -X r , is correctly no longer reported, and SACK block Z l -Z r is reported along with block Y l -Y r . This misbehavior implies that the data receiver reports less than the recommended maximum SACK blocks.
TESTING SACK BEHAVIOR
We extended the existing TBIT test "SackRcvr" [19] to determine a receiver's maximum number of reported SACK blocks. For clarity, most TCP segments sent by TBIT in our Figs 
C. Receiving Data Between Two Previous SACKs
We observed that some TCP flows report SACK information incompletely once the missing data between two SACK blocks (say X l -X r and Y l -Y r ) are received. The next SACK should report a single SACK block concatenating the first SACK block (X l -X r ), the missing data in between, and the second SACK block (Y l -Y r ).
Instead some implementations generate a SACK covering only the first SACK block and the missing data, i.e., (X l -Y l ), omitting the second SACK block. This behavior implies that the second SACK block is reneged.
Test C, illustrated in Fig. 3 , tests this misbehavior. The data receiver should report one SACK block covering the two SACK blocks and the data in between.
Test C 1. TBIT establishes a connection to IUT with SACK-Permitted option and ISN 400 2. IUT replies with SACK-Permitted option 3. TBIT sends segment (401) in order 4. IUT acks the in order data with ACK (402) 5. TBIT sends segment (403) creating a gap at IUT 6. IUT acks the out-of-order data with SACK 7. TBIT sends segment (405) creating 2nd gap at IUT 8. IUT acks the out-of-order data with SACK 9. TBIT sends segment (404) with missing data between the first and the second SACK blocks 10. IUT acks the out-of-order data with SACK 11. TBIT sends three RSTs to abort the connection A proper implementation is expected to report the out-of-order data (403-406) as shown in #10 in Fig. 3 . A misbehaving implementation would report the SACK block partially (403-405). 
D. Failure to Report SACKs in FIN Segments
When closing a connection, a receiving side sends a FIN segment along with the acknowledgment (ACK and SACK) for the data received. But for some data flows, we observed the FIN segment does not carry SACK information. As discussed in Section 2B, the receiver should include the SACK information along with the ACK. 
E. Failure to Report SACKs During Bidirectional Data Flow
This misbehavior occurs when the data flow is bidirectional. In some TCP flows, SACK information is not conveyed when the TCP segment carries data. If a TCP host is sending data continuously (e.g., an HTTP server), only one SACK is sent when out-of-order data are received, and SACK information is not piggybacked with the following segments. This misbehavior can cause less efficient SACK-based loss recovery since SACKs are sent only once for each out-of-order data arrival.
As stated in Section 2B, a conformant data receiver should include SACK information with all ACKs. If ACKs are piggybacked while sending data, SACKs should also be piggybacked in the TCP segments.
We added a new TBIT test for misbehavior E. To have bidirectional data flow and out-of-order data simultaneously, we used HTTP/1.1 GET requests [9] . HTTP/1.1 opens a persistent connection between TBIT and an IUT. TBIT requests the file index.pdf (11650 bytes) which is large enough to have a data transfer requiring several round trips so that SACK information can be observed in the segments.
Test E 1. TBIT establishes a connection to IUT with SACK-Permitted option and ISN 400 2. IUT replies with SACK-Permitted option 3. TBIT sends segment (401-450: GET /index.pdf HTTP/1.1 request) in order 4. IUT acks the in order data with ACK (450) 5. IUT starts sending segments with contents of index.pdf 6. TBIT sends segment (451) creating a gap at IUT 7. TBIT acks segments of IUT 8. IUT acks the out-of-order data with SACK 9. IUT continues sending contents of index.pdf with SACK 10. Once index.pdf is retrieved completely, TBIT sends three RSTs to abort the persistent connection A conformant implementation appends SACK information in TCP segments carrying data as shown in Fig. 5 , whereas a misbehaving implementation does not. 
F. Mishandling of Data Due to SACK Processing
While running Test E, we observed another SACK related misbehavior. Some segments do not carry maximal payload when SACKs are included. Rather they carry only the number of bytes equal to the SACK information appended.
We explain the misbehavior in detail using Test F shown in Fig. 6 . Test F modifies Test E. Instead of sending one out-of-order data, four are sent to check how data is sent by the TCP IUT as the number of appended SACKs increases. 
G. SACK Reappearance in Consecutive Connections
When verifying misbehaviors A-E, we ran the TBIT tests successively using different port numbers. We observed that in some TCP stacks, SACK information of a prior connection, say from Test A, would sometimes appear in the SYN-ACK segment of a new connection, say from Test B!
To further investigate the misbehavior, we developed Test G as shown in Fig. 7 . This test purposely uses the same initial sequence numbers for consecutive connections to demonstrate a worst case:
Test G 1. TBIT establishes a connection to IUT with SACK-Permitted option and ISN 400 on ephemeral port Eph 1 2. IUT replies with SACK-Permitted option on port 80 3. TBIT sends segment (401) in order 4. IUT acks the in order data with ACK (402) 5. TBIT sends segment (403) creating a gap at IUT 6. IUT acks the out-of-order data with SACK 7. TBIT sends three RSTs segments to abort the connection 8. After 'X' minutes, TBIT establishes a connection to IUT with SACK-Permitted option and ISN 400 on ephemeral port Eph 2 9. IUT replies with SACK-Permitted option on port 80 including a SACK block of the previous connection
In the second connection, the IUT sends an acknowledgment with SACK block 403-404 which is from the first connection. TBIT assumes 403 is SACKed, but the IUT never received the data. TBIT later sends data 402-403 to check if the IUT increases ACK to 405. The IUT returns an inconsistent ACK 403, SACK 403-405, but fortunately does not increase ACK to 405 so the connection remains reliable. In a real connection, eventually the sender will timeout on 403, discard all SACKed information, and retransmit the data, thus returning to a correct state [11] . However for a brief period of time, the data sender and receiver are in an inconsistent state. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The TBIT tests described in Section 2 were performed over a dedicated local area network with no loss. Tests were performed between two machines, A and B, as shown in Fig. 8 . The round trip time was on average 10ms, and no background traffic was present.
The IUTs being verified were the standard TCP stacks of various operating systems. We installed 27 operating systems using Oracle's VirtualBox virtualization software [20] on machine B. We ran tests for Mac OS X on another machine. TBIT 1.0 [19] was extended on FreeBSD 7.1 (machine A) with the seven TBIT tests detailed in the Section 2.
For each operating system, we installed an Apache HTTP Server [2] on machine B since TBIT is originally designed to infer TCP behavior of a web server. The TCP segments transmitted between TBIT and each IUT were captured at machine B. For this purpose, we also installed wireshark [21] on each Windows OS, and tcpdump [18] on each UNIX or UNIX-like OS. 
RESULTS
We verified the operating systems in Table I If the return path carrying SACKs were lossless, a TCP data receiver reporting at most two or three SACK blocks would not cause a problem. A data sender would always infer the proper state of the receive buffer for efficient SACK-based loss recovery described in RFC3517 [3] . When more than four SACK blocks exist at a data receiver, and SACK segments are lost, the chance of a data sender getting less accurate state of the receive buffer increases as SACK implementations' number of blocks reported is decreased. This misbehavior can lead to less efficient SACK-based loss recovery, and therefore decreased throughput (longer transfer times) when multiple TCP segments are lost within the same window. 
RELATED WORK
Two methodologies are mainly used to infer the TCP behavior: passive and active measurements. In passive measurements, collected trace files are analyzed offline to infer a specific protocol behavior. In 1997 Paxson [14] presents tcpanaly, a tool which automatically analyses the correctness of TCP implementations by inspecting traces collected for bulk data transfers.
resulted in SACKs whose sequence numbers were shifted. The authors suggest plausible causes as buggy TCP implementations or middleboxes (NATs, fingerprint scrubbers). In our CAIDA traces thus far analyzed and our TBIT tests, we did not see any shifted sequence numbers. Note that our experimental design has no middleboxes.
Our research combines both methodologies. We use TBIT to create synthetic TCP traffic to verify the proper SACK generation of TCP stacks. In addition, we capture TCP segments using tcpdump or wireshark for offline SACK generation analysis.
CONCLUSION
In this research, we designed a methodology and verified conformant SACK generation on 29 TCP stacks for a wide range of OSes: FreeBSD, Linux, Mac OS X, OpenBSD, Solaris and Windows. We identified the characteristics of the seven misbehaviors, and designed seven new TBIT tests to uncover these misbehaviors.
For the first five misbehaviors which are observed in the CAIDA trace files, we found at least one misbehaving TCP stack. We report various versions of OpenBSD and Windows OS to have misbehaving SACK generation implementations. In general, the misbehaving SACK implementations can cause a less efficient SACK-based loss recovery which yields to decreased throughput and longer transfer times.
During the TBIT testing, we identified two additional misbehaviors (F and G). Misbehavior F decreases the throughput by sending less than expected data while using SACKs. Most Linux and OpenSolaris systems show this misbehavior. Misbehavior G is more serious and can cause a TCP connection to be inconsistent should the sequence number space of one connection overlap that of a prior connection. Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris systems misbehave in this manner.
We note that for all misbehaviors, because SACKs are advisory thus allowing a data receiver to renege on all SACKed out-of-order data, eventually the data sender-receiver will timeout, discard all SACK information, and return to a correct state. Thus the data flow remains reliable; only performance degradation may occur.
As stated in the Introduction, we discovered SACK misbehaviors during our investigation of data reneging [7] . In that investigation, we argue that SACKs should be "permanent" (not advisory) meaning a data receiver MUST NOT renege on out-of-order data. If SACKs were to become permanent, since misbehavior G can result in unreliable data transfer, it would have to be fixed. While we hope misbehaviors A-F will be fixed, even if left as is, they will only result in reduced performance, not unreliable protocol behavior.
While simple in concept, SACK handling is complex to implement.
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